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A B S T R A C T
Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust “deontological” agents who reject harming
one person to save many others than “consequentialist” agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which
could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves
endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual
as equally important. In four studies (total N=2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-
consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such
preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for
non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker – but still
evident – preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-con-
sequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social
roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, pre-
ferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct
interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction (political leader).
Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the dif-
ferent dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.
1. Introduction
What unites psychologists, philosophers, and fiction writers? One
thing stands out: a fascination with how people do, or should, respond
when faced with a decision to sacrifice one innocent person to save a
greater number of people. What should one do, for example, if the only
way to prevent a major terrorist attack is to torture the child of the
suspected terrorist until she releases the information of where her fa-
ther is? In the academic literature, when someone endorses this harm in
such “sacrificial dilemmas” they are typically said to be making a
“consequentialist” (or “utilitarian”) judgment in line with con-
sequentialist ethical theories (Bentham, 1789/1983; Mill, 1863). These
theories posit that consequences are the only thing that matters when
making a moral decision - an action is good if it produces good con-
sequences, and bad if it produces bad consequences. In contrast, when
someone rejects inflicting harm on an innocent they are said to be
making a “non-consequentialist”, or “deontological” judgment in line
with deontological ethical theories (e.g. Fried, 1978; Kant, 1797/2002;
Rawls, 1971; Scanlon, 1998; W.D. Ross, 1930) positing that even if
sacrificing someone to save the lives of five others is an action that
maximises overall welfare (“the Good”), this does mean it is morally
correct (“the Right”).
Such dilemmas capture our imagination not just because they force
an internal moral conflict, but because we recognize the reputational
consequences that these impossible decisions might have for those who
make them. Recent research has shown that agents who make con-
sequentialist judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are seen as less moral,
trustworthy and warm, chosen less frequently as social partners, and
trusted less in economic exchanges (e.g. Bostyn & Roets, 2017; Sacco,
Brown, Lustgraaf, & Hugenberg, 2017; Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett,
2016; Rom, Weiss, & Conway, 2017; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum,
2013). Such preferences are socially rational, because standard for-
mulations of consequentialism require maximising the greater good
even if this involves using, harming, and even killing innocent people.
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This consequentialist rejection of any constraints on the maximisation
of welfare means that there is no place for rights, duties, and respect for
individual persons: if by stealing your new laptop and selling it on the
black market I could make a lot of money that I could donate to cha-
rities in the developing world to save children's lives, this is what I
should do – regardless of whether I have previously made (potentially
implicit) commitments not to steal from you. But expected adherence to
such implicit commitments is critical when selecting a social partner for
the purposes of cooperative exchange (e.g. friend, spouse, colleague).
Indeed, we have argued that this tension between consequentialism and
what we seek in social partners could, through mechanisms of partner
choice (e.g. Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Noë & Hammerstein,
1994), explain the prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions
(Everett et al., 2016). To the extent that people who make non-con-
sequentialist moral judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are favored in a
cooperation market - seemingly because these judgments signal a
commitment to cooperation - deontological moral intuitions could
therefore represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected
for through partner choice mechanisms (Everett et al., 2016).
Although sacrificial moral dilemmas make good drama, these are
not necessarily the most common conflict between consequentialist and
deontological principles. As outlined in the two-dimensional model of
utilitarian psychology (Kahane et al., 2018), consequentialist theories
like utilitarianism involve more than just decisions about whether to
sacrifice one to save a greater number (“instrumental harm”). At the core
of utilitarianism is the idea of impartial beneficence, that we must im-
partially maximise the well-being of all sentient beings on the planet in
such a way that “[e]ach is to count for one and none for more than one”
(Bentham, 1789/1983), not privileging compatriots, family members,
or ourselves over strangers – or even enemies. In general, people are
attracted to impartiality, preferring fairness to unfairness (e.g. Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999; Shaw, 2013; Tyler, 2000), and will choose equity over
efficiency when these are in conflict, seemingly out of a desire to appear
impartial (e.g. Choshen-Hillel, Shaw, & Caruso, 2015; Shaw, 2013). But
there are also limits to preferences for impartiality, for example when
balancing concerns of fairness and loyalty - as in the “whistleblowers
dilemma” (Dungan, Waytz, & Young, 2014; Waytz, Dungan, & Young,
2013).
Critically, the strict consequentialist impartial standpoint departs
substantially from common-sense morality, which posits special obliga-
tions to those with whom we have some kind of special relationship.
Parents, for example, have certain duties and obligations to their chil-
dren that are not shared by other people. These special obligations
make it morally permissible (or even required) to save one's own child
over, e.g., two strangers' children, and are incorporated into many
forms of deontological ethics (e.g. Annis, 1987; Held, 2006; Kamm,
2007; Scanlon, 1998). Indeed – as we return to later - persistent phi-
losophical criticisms of consequentialist theories centre on the fact that
they fail to account for special obligations such as those found in
friendship (e.g. Cocking & Oakley, 1995; Woodcock, 2009). Even if
people prefer impartiality when deciding allocations between two fa-
mily members, work colleagues, or strangers, we think it unlikely that
people will prefer impartiality when deciding allocations between a
single family member and a greater number of strangers. We know that
when we read The Iliad we harshly judge Agamemnon for his con-
sequentialist decision to sacrifice his daughter for the greater good.
When reading Dicken's Bleak House, might we also think badly of the
‘telescopic philanthropist’ Mrs. Jellyby who spends most of her time
setting up a charity for a far-off tribal community while ignoring the
needs of her own family? We think the answer is yes.
Just as with instrumental harm, in the domain of impartial benefi-
cence there is a deep conflict between what we seek in a social partner
and the requirements of consequentialism. In the simplest terms, non-
consequentialists should be preferred in the domain of instrumental
harm because we do not want social partners who will harm us in order
to maximise the greater good; non-consequentialists should be preferred
in the domain of impartial beneficence because we want social partners
who will help us even if it does not maximise the greater good.
Although we predict non-consequentialists would be preferred over
consequentialists across both dimensions, it is also reasonable to as-
sume that these preferences would be weaker when consequentialist
preferences are expressed through endorsement of impartial benefi-
cence than instrumental harm. Research on the omission bias shows
that directly harming someone is judged as more morally wrong than
failing to help or allowing harm to occur (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov &
Baron, 1990; Siegel, Crockett, & Dolan, 2017; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron,
1991), and psychologists have identified a general positive-negative
psychological asymmetry whereby “bad is stronger than good”
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), and negative in-
formation is seen as more diagnostic in impression formation and
person perception (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
In this paper we report four studies in which we investigated social
perceptions of non-consequentialist and consequentialist agents in both
sacrificial dilemmas tapping endorsement of instrumental harm, and
impartiality dilemmas tapping endorsement of impartial beneficence.
As well as theoretically extending the conceptual space in which non-
consequentialists might be preferred, we also investigate this across a
much greater range of dependent measures than has previously been
used. Specifically, we study partner preference by looking at two dif-
ferent economic games (the Trust Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma);
several distinct dimensions along which the agent's character could be
perceived (warmth; competence; morality); the different social roles in
which the agent would be preferred (as a friend, a spouse, a boss, and as
a political leader); and the different processes or motivations perceived
to influence the agent's moral decision (reason vs. emotion; strategic
considerations; altruistic motivations).
2. Study 1
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Open science
We report all measures,1 manipulations, and exclusions, and all
data, analysis code, and experiment materials are available for down-
load at: https://osf.io/yuv2m/.
2.1.2. Ethics statement
For all studies, relevant ethical guidelines were followed and the
research was approved through University of Oxford's Central
University Research Ethics Committee, with the reference number MS-
IDREC-C1-2015-098.
2.1.3. Participants
We recruited 201 participants via MTurk, and paid them $1.00 for
their time. Participants were excluded from completing the survey if
they had participated in related studies by us in the past, and were
excluded from analysis if took the survey more than once (N=4) or
failed a simple comprehension check asking them to indicate the
judgment their partner made in the dilemma (N=5). This left us a final
sample of 192 participants (98 female; Mage= 33, SD=9.84). Our
sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis (see
supplementary methods for details) and a sensitivity power analysis for
our main ANCOVA analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of 0.80,
indicated that the minimum effect size we had power to detect was a
small-to-medium effect of f=0.20.
1We report all measures in Study 1, with one exception: as an exploratory
question for different purposes, we asked participants how much they intended
to vote for Donald Trump or Hilary Clinton in the then-ongoing US elections.
These were not relevant to our purposes here, and are not analyzed or reported
here (or elsewhere).
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2.1.4. Design
This study had a two-group design (Agent Judgment: Non-
Consequentialist vs. Consequentialist), where participants were asked
to report their perceptions of a protagonist who made either a char-
acteristically consequentialist or non-consequentialist decision in an
impartiality dilemma. We included two different dilemmas to test the
generality of any effects we observed and to demonstrate that findings
were not specific to the one particular instantiation of the underlying
impartiality dilemma. Given that the pattern of results was broadly the
same2 across the two dilemmas, we collapsed responses across the two.
Nonetheless, full results using each dilemma separately can be seen in
the supplementary results.
2.1.5. Procedure
Participants read one of two3 dilemmas in which the protagonist
faced a decision whether to help a single member of her family, or
instead to help a greater number of strangers. The first impartiality
dilemma – “spending time” – was adapted from the “greater good”
dilemmas developed by Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, and Savulescu
(2015), and involved an engineer named Janet who had to decide
whether to spend her weekend cheering up her lonely mother, or in-
stead to help re-build houses for families who have lost theirs after
flooding in the region. The second dilemma – “spending money” – in-
volved a grandmother named Susan who had recently won a prize of
$2000 and had to decide whether to donate this to the Against Malaria
Foundation to provide mosquito nets to families in the developing
world at risk of malaria, or to give this to her grandson to get his car
fixed. In each of these dilemmas, the protagonist made either the
characteristically deontological, non-consequentialist decision (i.e. to
help the single family member) or the characteristically con-
sequentialist one (i.e. to help the greater number of strangers), and gave
a justification for doing so that either aligned more with the ethical
dictates of consequentialist (“more happiness for more people”) or
deontological (“duties she has”) theories (see the supplementary ma-
terials for the full text in Study 1; see Table 2 in the paper for the similar
text used in Studies 2–4). After being introduced to the dilemma and
what the protagonist chose to do, participants indicated what they
thought she should have done, and rated aspects of the character of the
protagonist in the dilemma.
2.1.6. Measures
Participant Moral Judgment in the moral dilemmas was measured
using three questions. First, participants were asked to make a binary
judgment about what they thought the protagonist in the dilemma
should have done (e.g. “Volunteer to help build the houses” vs. “Spend
the time cheering up her mother”). Second and third, participants were
asked to indicate how morally wrong they thought it would be to make
the consequentialist (e.g. volunteer) and non-consequentialist (e.g.
spend the time with the mother) decisions on a 1–7 scale (1= not at all
morally wrong; 7= extremely morally wrong).
Participant Consequentialist Tendencies were measured using the
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS: Kahane et al., 2018), consisting of
two subscales in which participants are asked to indicate how much
they agree or disagree with 9 items. The first subscale - Impartial Ben-
eficence (OUS-IB) - consists of 5 items (α=0.70) that all tap endorse-
ment of the impartial maximisation of the greater good even at the cost
of personal self-sacrifice, such as “If the only way to save another
person's life during an emergency is to sacrifice one's own leg, then one
is morally required to make this sacrifice”. The second subscale - In-
strumental Harm (OUS-IH) - consists of 4 items (α=0.78) that tap a
willingness to cause harm in order to bring about the greater good,
including “It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming
them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent people”.
Character Ratings were measured with seven questions in which
participants rated on a 1–7 scale how they perceived the protagonist in
the story to be in terms of how moral (1= extremely immoral/bad;
7= extremely moral/good), trustworthy (1= extremely untrustworthy;
7= extremely trustworthy), loyal (1= extremely disloyal; 7= extremely
loyal), reliable (1= extremely unreliable; 7= extremely reliable), warm
or cold (1= extremely cold; 7= extremely warm), competent (1= not at
all competent; 7= extremely competent), and capable (1= not at all
capable; 7= extremely capable) they thought the protagonist in the story
to be.
Role Suitability were measured with four questions in which par-
ticipants rated on 1–7 scale how good a partner they thought the pro-
tagonist in the story would be in four types of social roles: as a friend, as
a spouse, as a boss, and as a political leader, specifically President of the
United States (1= an extremely bad X; 7= an extremely good X).
Perceived Motivations of the protagonist's decision in the dilemma
was measured through two items where participants indicated how
much they thought the protagonist was driven by “altruistic, empathic
motives”, and how much they thought the protagonist was driven by
“strategic, reasoned motives” (1= not at all, 7= very much).
2.1.7. Analysis plan
Our primary measure of interest, like other recent studies (e.g.
Hughes, 2017; Rom et al., 2017), was how the protagonist in the story
was perceived depending on her decision, regardless of the judgment
the participant themselves made about the dilemma. One source of
variance that has not been controlled for in these previous studies,
however, is participants' own moral judgments. Therefore, in this study
(and both subsequent ones), we sought to control for participants' own
moral judgments in the dilemmas by entering participant wrongness of
the consequentialist action into an ANCOVA (consequentialist vs. non-
consequentialist protagonist judgment with participant wrongness as a
covariate). This allowed us to consider the interactive and main effects
of interest while also controlling for any residual variance caused by
participants' own judgments.4 Because the data was not normally dis-
tributed (for this study or the subsequent ones), we complemented the
ANCOVA controlling for participant wrongness with a non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U test (see supplementary results for results from Sha-
piro-Wilk tests of normality in each study). Means, standard deviations,
p-values from the Mann-Whitney U tests, and effect sizes can be seen in
Table 1.
For completeness, we also report in the supplementary materials a
series of 2×2 ANOVAs in which we entered both participant con-
sequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment and protagonist con-
sequentialist or non-consequentialist decision. However, given that we
were primarily interested in how the protagonist in the story was per-
ceived overall depending on her decision, not how she was perceived
differently by participants who themselves endorsed either option, in
the interests of clarity and conciseness we have chosen to report these
analyses in the supplementary materials.
2 There were a couple of differences between the results from each dilemma
in Study 1, but the pattern was still the same. For example, in both the spending
time and spending money variants, the consequentialist was thought to make a
better political leader, but this was only statistically significant in the spending
money dilemma.
3We originally also had a third dilemma involving “sharing opportunities”,
but for multiple theoretical and empirical issues outlined in the supplementary
file for Study 1, we excluded this third dilemma from analysis and did not
include it in the subsequent pre-registered studies.
4We also ran more exploratory analyses using scores on the Oxford
Utilitarianism Scale as a covariate instead of participant wrongness of the
specific consequentialist action in the dilemma. Across the dependent measures,
these two analyses yielded largely identical results and so we report only the
primary (pre-registered, for Studies 2–3) analysis using wrongness ratings in the
dilemma.
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2.2. Results
2.2.1. Participant judgments
Overall, most participants endorsed the characteristically non-con-
sequentialist option of helping the family member over the character-
istically consequentialist option of helping the greater number of
strangers (63%), but this was more pronounced in the spending money
dilemma (81%) than the spending time dilemma (55%).While partici-
pants did not think that either action was morally wrong, participants
who reported higher consequentialist tendencies thought it would be
more wrong to help the family number over the greater number of
strangers. In the interests of space, we report all further results on
participant judgments in the supplementary materials.
2.2.2. Character ratings
When the protagonist in the dilemma decided to help the family
member over the greater number of strangers, they were perceived as
significantly more trustworthy (F(1,189)= 7.23, p= .008, ηp2= 0.04;
U=3781, p= .026, d=0.37), reliable (F(1,189)= 17.36, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.08; U=3341, p < .001, d=0.59), loyal (F(1,189)= 128.23,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.40; U=1333, p < .001, d=1.61), and warm (F
(1,189)= 32.76, p < .001, ηp2= 0.15; U=2730, p < .001,
d=0.81). There were, however, no differences between con-
sequentialist and non-consequentialist agents in terms of perceived
morality (F(1,189)= 0.00, p= .97, ηp2= 0.00; U=4473, p= .72,
d=0.02), competence (F(1,189)= 3.35, p= .069, ηp2= 0.02;
U=4023, p= .11, d=0.25), or capability (F(1,189)= 1.60, p= .21,
ηp2= 0.00; U=4235, p= .31, d=0.17).
2.3. Role suitability
When the protagonist made the characteristically non-con-
sequentialist decision to help the family member over the greater
number of strangers they were expected to make a better friend (F
(1,189)= 36.65, p < .001, ηp2= 0.16; U=2519, p < .001,
d=0.87) and spouse (F(1,189)= 46.20, p < .001, ηp2= 0.20;
U=2417, p < .001, d=0.97), but there was no difference in suit-
ability as a boss (F(1,189)= 0.00, p=1.00, ηp2= 0.00; U=4545,
p= .88, d=0.00), and the protagonist was actually seen to make a
better political leader if they made the characteristically con-
sequentialist decision (F(1,189)= 8.62, p= .004, ηp2= 0.04;
U=3471, p= .002, d=0.42).
2.3.1. Perceived motivations
Participants thought the consequentialist protagonist was driven
more by strategic, reasoned motives than the non-consequentialist
protagonist, F(1,189)= 39.95, p < .001, ηp2= 0.17; U=2409,
p < .001, d=0.91, but there was no difference between agents in
perceptions of empathic, altruistic motives, F(1,189)= 0.07, p= .80,
ηp2= 0.00; U=4544, p= .87, d=0.03.
2.4. Discussion
Results from Study 1 using impartiality dilemmas were less con-
sistent than the unequivocal preference for the non-consequentialist in
sacrificial dilemmas we have seen in previous work (Everett et al.,
2016), but overall suggested that there may be a significant social cost
of making a consequentialist judgment in the domain of impartial
beneficence. Of the twelve measures, the non-consequentialist was
preferred in six; there was no difference for five items; and for only one
item was the consequentialist preferred. The non-consequentialist ap-
peared to be favored primarily in the context of direct interpersonal
relationships, being seen as more loyal, more reliable, more trust-
worthy, and warmer than a consequentialist actor, and being thought to
make a better friend and spouse. In contrast, there was no difference for
suitability as a boss, and the non-consequentialist was thought to make
a worse political leader than the consequentialist.
Certain limitations of this study should be noted, however. First,
Study 1 relied on character ratings of the protagonist and did not
measure participants' actual behaviour. Although important work on
this topic has been conducted without measuring behaviour (e.g.
Hughes, 2017; Rom et al., 2017; Uhlmann et al., 2013), we think it is
important to establish whether participants would actually be willing to
‘put their money where their mouth is’ and - like for the sacrificial di-
lemmas (Everett et al., 2016) - trust a non-consequentialist in the im-
partiality dilemmas with their money more than they do a con-
sequentialist. Second, and relatedly, here we focused on ratings of
hypothetical actors in moral dilemmas, but it is possible that results
would be weaker when participants were thinking about (ostensibly)
real other participants, not just judging a hypothetical protagonist.
3. Study 2
In Study 2 we looked again at perceptions of consequentialist agents
endorsing impartial beneficence, this time adding an economic Trust
Game to establish whether the partner preference has real behavioural
consequences in a cooperation market, and turned back to examining a
third-party judge, as in the majority of this work (Bostyn & Roets, 2017;
Everett et al., 2016; Rom et al., 2017). We also wanted to replicate and
extend previous findings that non-consequentialist judges in sacrificial
dilemmas are rated as more moral and trustworthy and receive more
transfers in an economic Trust Game. We sought to extend this by using
two different sacrificial dilemmas, and by using a greater range of de-
pendent measures than used in the original studies.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Open science
Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan were all pre-registered at
the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/prm3a/). We report all
measures,5 manipulations, and exclusions in this study. All data,
Table 1
Ms and SDs as a function of protagonist judgment in the dilemma (Study 1).
Non-consq
protagonist
Consequentialist
protagonist
p-value d Prefer
Morality 5.91 (0.94) 5.93 (1.03) .72 0.02
Trustworthiness 6.02 (0.98) 5.60 (1.25) .03 0.37 Non-C
Loyalty 6.55 (0.74) 4.64 (1.51) < .001 1.61 Non-C
Reliability 5.99 (0.99) 5.24 (1.50) < .001 0.59 Non-C
Warmth 6.27 (0.90) 5.28 (1.47) < .001 0.81 Non-C
Competence 6.05 (1.01) 5.77 (1.19) .11 0.25
Capability 6.05 (0.98) 5.87 (1.11) .31 0.17
Suitability as a
friend
6.10 (1.00) 5.05 (1.38) < .001 0.87 Non-C
Suitability as a
spouse
6.09 (0.96) 4.90 (1.45) < .001 0.97 Non-C
Suitability as a
boss
5.33 (1.20) 5.33 (1.32) .88 0.00
Suitability as a
political
leader
4.53 (1.42) 5.13 (1.47) .002 0.42 Consq
Altruistic motives 5.53 (1.46) 5.49 (1.61) .87 0.03
Strategic motives 3.18 (1.73) 4.81 (1.86) < .001 0.91
5We also collected data asking participants to indicate on a single scale how
much they thought the agent's “decision was driven more by strategic, reasoned
motives [−5] versus more empathic, altruistic motives [+5]?”. However, on
reflection this measure is sub-optimal both because it conflates reasoned and
strategic motives, perhaps inappropriately, and forces participants to select one
side (perhaps participants think the action is both more reasoned and
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analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download at:
https://osf.io/bdev3/.
3.1.2. Participants
In accordance with the pre-registration, we recruited 1000 partici-
pants via MTurk. Participants were excluded from completing the study
if they had participated in related studies by us in the past, and were
excluded from analysis if they did not complete the study in full (N=6)
or failed a simple comprehension check asking them to indicate the
judgment their partner made in the dilemma (N=41). This left us with
a final sample of 953 participants (467 female;Mage= 34, SD=10.44).
Our sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis (see
supplementary methods for details) and a sensitivity power analysis for
our main 2×2 ANCOVA analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of
0.80, indicated that the minimum effect size we had power to detect
was a small effect of f=0.09.
All participants were paid $1.80 for participating, in accordance
with an hourly US minimum wage of $7.25 and the survey taking ap-
proximately 15min. Participants were paid a bonus of up to $0.60
depending on their decision in the game. To determine bonuses, we
recruited a separate group of participants to play as second movers,
who answered one of the four moral dilemmas and then indicated what
percentage of the money transferred to them they would return. We
collected data until we had at least one participant in each dilemma
who gave a consequentialist or non-consequentialist decision, and se-
lected the first person who met that criteria (i.e. the first con-
sequentialist in the spending money dilemma; the first non-con-
sequentialist in the spending time dilemma). We then determined
bonuses for participants within each condition by looking at what
percentage the corresponding second mover said they would return and
paid participants accordingly.
3.1.3. Design
We had a 2 (Dilemma Type: Sacrificial vs. Impartiality× 2 (Agent
Judgment: Consequentialist vs. Non-Consequentialist) between-subjects
design, with two dilemmas in each category being used as variations of
the experimental materials. Participants read one of four dilemmas and
rated a partner (“agent”) who read the same dilemma and made either a
consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment and justification (see
Table 2 for full text). All dilemmas involved a person called “Amy” who
faces a dilemma with two decision options aligning more with con-
sequentialism versus non-consequentialism. Two (‘footbridge’, ‘vac-
cine’) were sacrificial dilemmas (sacrificing one person to save a greater
number of others), and two (‘spending money’, ‘spending time’) were
impartiality dilemmas slightly adapted6 from Study 1 (helping a family
member or greater number of strangers). Our primary interest was in
the differences between the sacrificial and impartiality dilemmas, so we
combined responses across the two sacrificial and two impartiality di-
lemmas.
3.1.4. Procedure
At the start of the study participants were introduced to one of the
four dilemmas and asked to indicate which of two behaviours they
thought Amy should do, how morally wrong it would be to perform the
consequentialist action, and how much responsibility they perceived
Amy to have to the people in the story. Next, participants were in-
troduced to a Trust Game (TG; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The
TG typically involves two participants: an investor (“Player A”), and a
trustee (“Player B”). Player A is given some money and told that they
may send a proportion (from zero to the full amount) of this money to
the trustee, and that the experimenter will multiply the money sent by
some amount. Once Player B receives the money, they are told that they
may send back a portion of it to the investor, again ranging from zero to
the full amount. In our study, participants (who always played the role
of Person A) were able to allocate between $0.00 and $0.30, and any
money they sent to Person B was doubled. Participants were then re-
quired to successfully complete three comprehension questions about
the structure of the game to move to the next page. Participants were
then informed that they were completing this task playing as Person A
and that we had already conducted a first-wave of data collection in
which we recruited people to play as Person B (the second player, who
returns money back to the first player) and had them indicate, for all
the possible amounts they could receive from Person A, how much they
Table 2
Reported judgments and justifications of the agent (“Person B”) in Studies 2–3.
Non-consequentialist agent Consequentialist agent
Sacrificial Footbridge “I think that Amy should not push the large man to save the five
workers. I know that by doing this she could stop the trolley and save
more lives, but I think that killing people is just wrong even if it has
good consequences.”
“I think that Amy should push the large man to save the five workers.
By doing this she could stop the trolley and save more lives, and I think
that it is better to save many lives than just one”
Vaccine “I think that Amy should not inject the lab assistants with the
substances to find out which is the vaccine. I know that by doing this
she could find out which is the vaccine and therefore be able to save
many more lives, but I think that killing people is just wrong, even if it
has good consequences.”
“I think that Amy should inject the lab assistants with the substances to
find out which is the vaccine. By doing this she could find out which is
the vaccine and therefore be able to save many more lives, and I think
that it is better to save many lives than just one”
Impartiality Spending
Money
“I think that Amy should give the $500 to her grandson so that he could
get his car fixed. I know that by donating the money to charity Amy
would have the chance to bring about more happiness for more people,
but I also think that respecting the duties she has to her grandson is
more important.”
“I think that Amy should give the $500 to the charity providing polio
vaccinations in the developing world. I know that by donating the
money to charity Amy would have the chance to bring about more
happiness for more people, and I think this is more important than any
duties she has to her grandson”
Spending Time “I think that Amy should spend the time with her mother instead of
volunteering to build houses. I know that that by volunteering Amy
would have the chance to bring about more happiness for more people,
but I also think that respecting the duties she has to her mother is more
important.”
“I think that Amy should spend the time volunteering to build houses
instead of spending the time with her mother. I know that by
volunteering Amy would have the chance to bring about more
happiness for more people, and I think this is more important than any
duties she has to her mother”
(footnote continued)
altruistic). Given these methodological concerns, we do not report these results
in the paper.
6 For both dilemmas we changed the protagonist's name to Amy so that it was
the same for all participants. For “spending money” dilemma, we reduced the
amount from $2000 to $500, because we were concerned that $2000 was un-
realistic as a cost for fixing a car, since this would likely buy a new car. For the
“spending time” dilemma we changed the charity from the Against Malaria
Foundation to one that provides polio vaccinations to children in developing
countries, because we thought that more people would know about polio than
the work of the AMF, and we changed the reason that the mother needed help
from feeling lonely to instead because she was suffering from migraines, to
make both causes related to health.
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wanted to return. Participants learned that they would be told how
Person B responded in the moral dilemma they answered at the start of
the survey, and then their own task was to decide how much - if any-
thing - they wanted to transfer to Person B, with their eventual bonus
being dependent on how much the participant decided to transfer, and
how much Person B decided to return back. After receiving the in-
formation about the TG and their role in the study, participants entered
the main stage of the study where they were randomly assigned to play
with an agent (Person B) who either made a consequentialist or non-
consequentialist choice and justification in the moral dilemma partici-
pants read at the start of the study (see Table 2). Participants were told
of the agent's judgment and reasoning and completed a comprehension
check to confirm they understood what judgment the agent/Person B
chose (41 participants answered this incorrectly and were excluded
from data analysis). Participants then completed the TG and the other
dependent measures (see below).
3.1.5. Measures
Participant Moral Judgment in the moral dilemma was measured in
two ways: first, as a binary judgment in which participants indicated
what they thought Amy should do in the moral dilemma (e.g. “I think
that Amy should spend the time with her mother” vs. “I think that Amy
should spend the time volunteering”); and second, as a continuous
measure on an eleven-point scale of how wrong participants thought it
would be to perform the consequentialist action instead of the non-
consequentialist one (−5= absolutely morally wrong/forbidden;
0= neither right nor wrong; 5= absolutely morally required/should always
be done).
Partner Preference was measured by a single question in which
participants were asked to indicate what kind of partner they would
have preferred to play the TG with if they had a choice: someone who
made a consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment.
Role Suitability, like in Study 1, was measured with four questions in
which participants rated on 1–7 scale how good a partner they thought
the protagonist in the story would be in four types of social roles: as a
friend, as a spouse, as a boss, and as political leader, i.e. President of the
United States (1= an extremely bad X; 7= an extremely good X).
Character Ratings were measured with seven questions in which
participants rated on 1–7 scale how moral, trustworthy, loyal, warm or
cold, sociable, competent, and capable they thought the agent to be.
Ratings of how sociable (1= not at all sociable; 7= extremely sociable)
and warm or cold (1= extremely cold; 7= extremely warm) participants
thought the agent was were combined into an overall score of warmth
(α=0.76); and ratings of how competent (1= not at all competent;
7= extremely competent) and capable (1= not at all capable; 7= ex-
tremely capable) participants thought the agent was were combined into
an overall score of competence (α=0.88). Ratings of how moral
(1= extremely immoral/bad; 7= extremely moral/good) and trustworthy
(1= extremely untrustworthy; 7= extremely trustworthy) participants
thought the agent were combined into an overall score of morality
(α=0.85). We analyzed loyalty separately because in the impartiality
dilemmas but not the sacrificial ones the non-consequentialist action
strongly involved loyalty (to one's parents). We created these composite
scores both in the interests of space and because, given they are in-
tended to measure the same construct, we expected – and found - no
differences between the results for each. Nonetheless, full results using
the individual items can be seen in the supplementary results.
3.1.6. Analysis plan
As outlined in the pre-registration, our primary analysis of interest
was on the main effects of agent consequentialist or non-con-
sequentialist judgment in both the sacrificial and impartiality di-
lemmas, and whether there was an interaction effect between them
such that the effect was stronger for one type of dilemma. Across
Studies 2–4, we used a 2×2 ANCOVA (sacrificial vs. impartiality di-
lemma; consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist agent judgment; par-
ticipant ratings of wrongness of consequentialist action as a covariate)
to look at the interactive effect of dilemma type and agent judgment
and explore our main effects while controlling for any variance caused
by participants' own judgments. Because the data was again not nor-
mally distributed we complemented this ANCOVA with non-parametric
Mann-Whitney U tests (see supplementary results for results from
Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality in each study). All Ms and SDs as a
function of dilemma type and agent judgment, along with the p-values
from a Mann-Whitney U test and effect size of the difference between a
consequentialist and non-consequentialist agent for each type of di-
lemma can be seen in Table 3.
In accordance with the pre-registration, in the supplementary ma-
terials we also report (1) main effects of agent judgment for each di-
lemma separately, and (2) results from a 2×2×2 ANOVA in which
we entered participant moral judgment as a fixed factor (instead of a
covariate). As can be seen in the supplementary materials, results were
consistent across the two dilemmas in each category, and we only found
significant 3-way interactions in four of the eleven DVs (indicating that
non-consequentialist and consequentialist participants responded sig-
nificantly differently in the different dilemmas).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Participant judgments
The majority of participants endorsed the non-consequentialist op-
tion in the sacrificial dilemmas (69%), rejecting the sacrifice of one to
save the lives of a greater number. This was the same for the footbridge
(69%) and vaccine (69%) variants. Similarly, most participants en-
dorsed the non-consequentialist option in the impartiality dilemmas
(70%), endorsing helping a family member over impartially helping a
greater number. This was the same for both dilemmas but was more
pronounced in the spending money (83%) than the spending time
Table 3
Ms, SDs, p-values and effects sizes in Study 2 as a function of dilemma type and agent judgment.
Sacrificial dilemmas Impartiality dilemmas
Non-conseq. Consq. p-value d Prefer Non-conseq. Consq. p-value d Prefer
Transfer amounts 20.10 (11.76) 17.23 (11.87) .006 0.23 Non-C 18.46 (11.97) 18.59 (11.93) .98 0.01 –
Predicted returns 37.53 (24.60) 31.15 (24.04) .005 0.26 Non-C 32.97 (23.46) 37.57 (25.86) .04 −0.19 Consq
Preferred partner in TG 70% 30% < .001 N/A Non-C 53% 47% .16 N/A –
Morality 5.55 (1.01) 4.37 (1.22) < .001 1.04 Non-C 5.10 (1.05) 5.04 (1.11) .56 0.05 –
Warmth 5.57 (0.97) 4.52 (1.16) < .001 0.98 Non-C 5.11 (1.07) 5.14 (1.14) .68 −0.03 –
Competence 5.35 (1.15) 5.02 (1.19) .002 0.29 Non-C 5.35 (1.14) 5.28 (1.08) .34 0.06 –
Loyalty 5.54 (1.15) 4.19 (1.51) < .001 1.01 Non-C 5.95 (1.04) 4.50 (1.44) < .001 1.15 Non-C
Suitability as a friend 5.59 (1.08) 4.31 (1.45) < .001 1.00 Non-C 5.39 (1.18) 4.78 (1.27) < .001 0.50 Non-C
Suitability as a spouse 5.28 (1.17) 4.04 (1.44) < .001 0.95 Non-C 5.25 (1.24) 4.55 (1.36) < .001 0.54 Non-C
Suitability as a boss 4.98 (1.45) 4.13 (1.55) < .001 0.57 Non-C 4.75 (1.44) 4.70 (1.37) .49 0.04 –
Suitability as a political leader 4.33 (1.58) 3.97 (1.75) .04 0.22 Non-C 4.08 (1.42) 4.46 (1.51) .003 −0.26 Consq
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variant (55%). Higher scores on the Impartial Beneficence subscale of
the OUS predicted lower wrongness judgments of the consequentialist
action in the impartiality dilemmas (r=0.22 p < .001), and higher
scores on the Instrumental Harm subscale predicted lower wrongness
judgments of the consequentialist action in the sacrificial dilemmas
(r=0.62, p < .001) (see supplementary materials for further results
looking at participant judgment).
3.2.2. Character ratings
We first looked at character ratings (see Fig. 1). For perceived mor-
ality, the ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,948)=74.69, p < .001, ηp2=0.07; U=147,829, p < .001,
d=0.56, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judg-
ment on how moral participants perceived the agent to be, F
(1,948)=61.30, p < .001, ηp2=0.06. While a non-consequentialist was
seen as more moral than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F
(1,489)=138.84, p < .001, ηp2=0.22; U=46,702, p < .001,
d=1.04, there was no difference in perceived morality of non-con-
sequentialist vs. consequentialist agents in the impartiality dilemmas, F
(1,458)=0.33, p=.56, ηp2=0.00; U=27,382, p=.56, d=0.05.
For perceived warmth, the ANCOVA revealed the predicted main
effect of agent judgment, F(1,948)= 52.71, p < .001, ηp2= 0.05;
U=143,077, p < .001, d=0.47, and a significant interaction of di-
lemma type and agent judgment on how warm and sociable partici-
pants perceived the agent to be, F(1,948)= 59.01, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.06. While a non-consequentialist was seen as warmer than the
consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F(1,489)= 119.95,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.20; U=45,840, p < .001, d=0.98, there was no
difference in the impartiality dilemmas, F(1,458)= 0.08, p= .77,
ηp2= 0.00; U=25,980, p= .68, d=0.03.
For perceived competence, the ANCOVA showed the predicted main
effect of agent judgment, F(1,948)= 7.53, p= .001, ηp2= 0.01;
U=125,545, p= .004, d=0.18, and a significant interaction effect of
agent judgment and dilemma judgment, F(1,948)= 3.24, p= .006,
ηp2= 0.00. While a non-consequentialist was seen as more competent
than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F(1,489)= 10.10,
p= .002, ηp2= 0.02; U=34,981, p= .002, d=0.29, there was no
difference in the impartiality dilemmas, F(1,458)= 0.46, p= .50,
ηp2= 0.00; U=27,898, p= .34, d=0.06.
Finally, we turned to the single item of perceived loyalty. The
ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,948)= 283.97, p < .001, ηp2= 0.23; U=174,248, p < .001,
d=1.07, and there was no significant interaction of dilemma type and
agent judgment, F(1,948)= 0.27, p= .61, ηp2= 0.00. For both di-
lemma types, an agent who made a non-consequentialist judgment was
seen as more loyal than one who made a consequentialist judgment.
This was the case both in the sacrificial dilemmas F(1,489)= 128.14,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.21; U=45,614, p < .001, d=1.01, and the im-
partiality dilemmas, F(1,458)= 159.22, p < .001, ηp2= 0.26;
U=41,528, p < .001, d=1.15.
Overall, then, across all the character ratings there were significant
main effects such that the non-consequentialist was seen as more moral,
warmer, more competent, and more loyal (see Fig. 1). With the ex-
ception of loyalty, however, these results were limited to the sacrificial
dilemmas. In the impartiality dilemmas, the consequentialist was not
seen as less moral, warm, or competent than the non-consequentialist.
3.2.3. Trust Game
An ANCOVA revealed a marginally significant interaction of di-
lemma type and agent judgment on transfer amounts, F(1,948)= 3.80,
p= .052, ηp2= 0.00, and though there was no main effect of agent
judgment when using the ANCOVA controlling for participant wrong-
ness, F(1,948)= 3.18, p= .075, ηp2= 0.00, there was a significant
main effect in the non-parametric test (because the data was not nor-
mally distributed), U=121,638, p= .043, d=0.12. Looking at simple
effects, we found that participants transferred significantly more to a
non-consequentialist agent than a consequentialist agent in the sacri-
ficial dilemmas, F(1,489)= 7.22, p= .007, ηp2= 0.001; U=34,431,
p= .005, d=0.24, but there was no difference in the impartiality di-
lemmas, F(1,458)= 0.01, p= .91, ηp2= 0.00; U=26,593, p= .098,
d=0.01 (see Fig. 2). As an exploratory analysis, we looked at beha-
viour in the TG for each dilemma separately and found that our overall
non-significant ANCOVA effect was driven by non-consequentialists
being preferred over consequentialists only in the vaccine sacrificial
dilemma, and not the footbridge (see supplementary results). While this
might be surprising given our robust effects found in previous work, we
think it likely this is driven by MTurk participants being overly familiar
with the footbridge dilemma.
Fig. 1. Character ratings in Studies 2–4 as a function of agent judgment and dilemma type. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was
consistently rated as higher in morality (1A), loyalty (1B), warmth (1C), and competence (1D). In the impartiality dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was seen as
more loyal but was not consistently rated as more moral, warm, or competent. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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For predicted returns, surprisingly an ANCOVA revealed no sig-
nificant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how much
participants expected their partner to return, F(1,948)= 12.02,
p= .57, ηp2= 0.01, and no main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,948)= 0.33, p= .57, ηp2= 0.00; U=111,551, p= .49, d=0.04.
While the interaction was non-significant, simple effects revealed that a
non-consequentialist agent was predicted to return more than the
consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F(1,489)= 8.53, p= .004,
ηp2= 0.002; U=34,822, p= .002, d=0.26, but the consequentialist
was predicted to return more than the non-consequentialist in the im-
partiality dilemmas, F(1,458)= 3.99, p= .046, ηp2= 0.001;
U=23,683, p= .036, d=−0.19.
3.2.4. Partner preference
Next, we looked at which type of person the participant would have
liked to play the TG with, if they'd had a choice: the consequentialist or
non-consequentialist. A logistic regression revealed a significant effect
of dilemma type, B=−0.70, SE=0.14, Z=−5.16, p < .001, with
chi-square analyses revealing that while most participants (70%) pre-
ferred the non-consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas,
x2(1)= 75.71, p < .001, there was no difference in preference for a
non-consequentialist (53%) or consequentialist (47%) in the impartial
dilemmas, x2(1)= 1.95, p= .16.
3.2.5. Role suitability
Next, we looked at perceived suitability for different roles (see
Fig. 3). Considering perceived suitability as a friend, an ANCOVA re-
vealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,948)= 137.60,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.13; U=68,383, p < .001, d=0.76, along with a
significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how
good a friend participants thought the agent would be, F
(1,948)= 16.78, p < .001, ηp2= 0.02. In both dilemma types, when
the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to
make a better friend, but this was stronger for the sacrificial dilemmas,
F(1,489)= 123.59, p < .001, ηp2= 0.20; U=45,524, p < .001,
d=1.00, than for the impartiality dilemmas, F(1,458)= 29.66,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.06; U=33,921, p < .001, d=0.50.
For perceived suitability as a spouse, an ANCOVA revealed the
predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,948)= 133.71, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.12; U=69,310, p < .001, d=0.75, along with a significant
interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a friend
participants thought the agent would be, F(1,948)= 10.84, p= .001,
ηp2= 0.01. In both dilemmas, when the agent made a non-con-
sequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better spouse, but
this was stronger for the sacrificial dilemmas, F(1,489)= 112.39,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.19; U=44,716, p < .001, d=0.95, than for the
impartiality dilemmas, F(1,458)= 33.59, p < .001, ηp2= 0.07;
U=34,319, p < .001, d=0.54.
For suitability as a boss, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main
effect of agent judgment, F(1,948)= 22.95, p < .001, ηp2= 0.02;
U=133,232, p < .001, d=0.32 and a significant interaction of di-
lemma type and agent judgment on how good a boss participants
thought the agent would be, F(1,948)= 18.12, p < .001, ηp2= 0.02.
When the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment in the sacrificial
dilemmas they were expected to make a better boss, F(1,489)= 39.98,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.08; U=39,299, p < .001, d=0.57, but there was
no difference for the impartiality dilemmas F(1,458)= 0.15, p= .70,
ηp2= 0.00; U=27,519, p= .49, d=0.04.
For suitability as a political leader, an ANCOVA revealed a sig-
nificant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a
political leader participants thought the agent would be, F
(1,948)= 12.81, p < .001, ηp2= 0.01, but no main effect of agent
judgment, F(1,948)= 0.01, p= .92, ηp2= 0.00; U=111,573, p= .65,
d=0.00. Looking at simple effects, in the sacrificial dilemmas a non-
consequentialist agent was expected to make a better political leader, F
(1,489)= 5.54, p= .019, ηp2= 0.01; U=33,389, p= .040, d=0.21,
but in the impartiality dilemmas it was a consequentialist agent who
was expected to make a better political leader, F(1,458)= 7.55,
p= .006, ηp2= 0.002; U=22,423, p= .003, d=−0.26.
Overall, results showed that a non-consequentialist agent in the
sacrificial dilemmas was seen to make a better friend, boss, spouse, and
political leader than the agent who made a consequentialist judgment
(see Fig. 3). In the impartiality dilemmas, a non-consequentialist was
also seen as making a better friend and spouse, while there was no
difference for suitability as a boss, and the consequentialist had the
edge for consideration as a political leader.
3.3. Discussion
In Study 2 we had two key aims: first, to investigate how partici-
pants perceived and interacted with someone who made a con-
sequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment in impartiality di-
lemmas; and second, to replicate previous work demonstrating partner
preference in sacrificial dilemmas in a pre-registered study with new
measures and a different dilemma.
In the sacrificial dilemmas we successfully replicated and extended
previous findings, showing that people who make non-consequentialist
judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are perceived more positively than
those who make a consequentialist judgment. Non-consequentialists
received more transfers in a Trust Game, were seen as more moral and
trustworthy, and when given a choice participants indicated they would
rather play with a non-consequentialist than a consequentialist.
Moreover, we found that this preference for non-consequentialists ex-
tended to character ratings of warmth, competence, and loyalty, and
that non-consequentialists were seen to make a better friend, a better
boss, a better spouse, and a better political leader. In every single de-
pendent measure, a person making a non-consequentialist judgment in
a sacrificial dilemma was preferred.
In the impartiality dilemmas, the picture was much less consistent.
The consequentialist in the impartial dilemmas was preferred on two
measures: they were expected to return more in the TG, and they were
thought to make a better political leader. The non-consequentialist was
preferred on three measures: they were expected to be more loyal and
make a better friend and spouse. For most measures, however, there
were no differences between the consequentialist and non-
Fig. 2. Transfers in a Trust Game as a function of agent judgment and dilemma
type. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemmas participants transferred more
to a non-consequentialist than a consequentialist, but there was no difference in
the impartiality dilemmas. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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consequentialist: they were seen as equally moral, warm, and compe-
tent; they were thought to make an equally good boss. While impartial
consequentialists were expected to make a better political leader, they
were thought to make a worse friend and spouse; and while they were
expected to return more in a TG, this did not translate into actual in-
creased transfers by participants, nor greater selection of the con-
sequentialist for a future TG.
One potential limitation is that while 83% of participants endorsed
the non-consequentialist judgment in the spending money variant, only
55% of participants did so in the spending time variant. Moreover, in
this study – and in contrast to Study 1 – we did not find the expected
negative correlation between OUS impartial beneficence scores and
perceived wrongness of the consequentialist action in the spending time
dilemma. This suggests that in this study participants themselves did
not actually perceive the spending time dilemma to be one in which one
action is consequentialist, and if this is the case, one must be careful
about inferring too much about how people think about “con-
sequentialist” judgers in the same dilemma (see supplementary results
for analyses looking only at the spending money variant).
4. Study 3
In Study 3, we sought to replicate and extend the results in Study 2
using a streamlined set of moral judgment scenarios and a Prisoner's
Dilemma (PD: Axelrod, 1980; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) instead of a
Trust Game. The PD is a 2-person social dilemma that exemplifies the
tension that exists between individual rationality and group rationality:
each individual receives a higher payoff for defecting from what is in
the collective interest than for cooperating, but all individuals are
better off if they all cooperate than if they all defect (Dawes, 1980;
Hardin, 1968; 1998). Cooperation in the PD requires both the goal of
cooperation and the expectation that others will cooperate (Pruitt &
Kimmel, 1977), or in other terms, a social preference to cooperate and a
belief that others will too (Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 2015a, 2015b).
Using the PD allowed us to assess not only the expectation that parti-
cipants might have that consequentialists are less likely to cooperate
than non-consequentialists, but also to study whether participants who
themselves made a consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment
would be more likely to cooperate.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Open science
Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan were all pre-registered at
the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/dfz2j/) as part of the Pre-
Registration Challenge. We report all measures, manipulations, and
exclusions in this study. All data, analysis code, and experiment ma-
terials are available for download at: https://osf.io/v6z53/.
4.1.2. Participants
In accordance with the pre-registration, 498 participants completed
the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from com-
pleting the survey if they had participated in related studies by us in the
past, and were excluded from analysis if they completed the survey
more than once (N=5), or failed a simple comprehension check asking
them to indicate the decision their partner made in the dilemma
(N=12), leaving us with a final sample of 485 participants (250 fe-
male; Mage= 35, SD=11.13). Our sample size was determined
through an a priori power analysis (see supplementary methods for
details) and a sensitivity power analysis for our main 2×2 ANCOVA
analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of 0.80, indicated that the
minimum effect size we had power to detect was a small effect of
f=0.13. All participants were paid $1.80 for participating and were
again paid bonuses depending on their decision in the game. To cal-
culate bonuses, we selected the decision (to cooperate or defect) of the
first participant who met the criteria for each condition (e.g. who had
the sacrificial dilemma, gave a consequentialist decision themselves,
and were playing with a non-consequentialist agent) and then matched
participants accordingly (see supplementary file for more information).
4.1.3. Design
This study had a 2 (Dilemma Type: Sacrificial vs. Impartiality)× 2
(Agent Judgment: Non-Consequentialist × Consequentialist) between-
subjects experimental design. The study was identical to Study 2, except
we used two dilemmas (the vaccine for the sacrificial dilemma, and the
spending money for the impartiality dilemma) instead of four, and used
a PD instead of a TG.
Fig. 3. Role suitability in Studies 2–4 as a function of agent judgment and dilemma type. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was
preferred for all four social roles. In the impartiality dilemmas, the non-consequentialist was consistently preferred as a friend (3A) and spouse (3B), but not a boss
(3C) or political leader (3D). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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4.1.4. Procedure
Like in Study 2, participants were first introduced to the moral di-
lemma and asked to make their own judgments. Next, participants were
introduced to the PD and received extensive training about the struc-
ture of the game based on the procedure of Everett, Ingbretsen,
Cushman, and Cikara (2017) (see materials on OSF for full instructions:
https://osf.io/v6z53). Participants were required to complete four
comprehension questions about the payoffs to each player depending
on both player's choices in an example matrix, and they had to answer
these correctly in order to move to the next page. After completing this,
participants entered the main part of the study where they were told
what decision their partner made in the moral dilemma, and made their
choice either to cooperate (X) or defect (Y) in the main PD. For the main
PD, if both players cooperated they received 3 points each; if both
defected they received 1 point each; and if one defected and one co-
operated, the defector received 5 points and the cooperator received 0
points.
4.1.5. Analysis plan
The analysis plan for this study was identical to that in Study 2. See
Table 4 for Ms and SDs as a function of dilemma type and agent
judgment, as well as p-values from a Mann-Whitney U test, and effect
sizes. In accordance with the pre-registration, for the supplementary
materials we again ran analyses looking at a 2×2×2 ANOVA in
which we entered participant moral judgment as a fixed factor (instead
of a covariate). There were, however, no significant 3-way interactions,
further justifying our focus on the ANCOVA.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Participant judgments
The majority of participants endorsed the non-consequentialist op-
tion in the sacrificial dilemma (68%), rejecting the sacrifice of one to
save the lives of a greater number. Similarly, most participants en-
dorsed the non-consequentialist option in the impartiality dilemma
(79%), endorsing helping a family member over impartially helping a
greater number. As for the previous two studies, further results looking
at participant judgment can be found in the supplementary materials.
4.2.2. Character ratings
We first looked at character ratings (see Fig. 1). For the two items
measuring perceived morality (α=0.89), the ANCOVA revealed the
predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,480)= 84.19, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.15; U=41,514, p < .001, d=0.79, and a significant inter-
action of dilemma type and agent judgment on how moral participants
perceived the agent to be, F(1,480)= 72.68, p < .001, ηp2= 0.13.
While a non-consequentialist was seen as more moral than the con-
sequentialist in the sacrificial dilemma, F(1,247)= 142.20, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.37; U=13,230, p < .001, d=1.47, there was no difference in
the impartiality dilemma, F(1,232)= 0.11, p= .74, ηp2= 0.00;
U=7080, p= .65, d=0.03.
For perceived the two items measuring warmth (α=0.74), the
ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,480)= 87.88, p < .001, ηp2= 0.15; U=42,494, p < .001,
d=0.83, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent
judgment on how warm and sociable participants perceived the agent
to be, F(1,480)= 50.61, p < .001, ηp2= 0.10. While a non-con-
sequentialist was seen as warmer than the consequentialist in the sa-
crificial dilemmas, F(1,247)= 140.09, p < .001, ηp2= 0.36;
U=13,218, p < .001, d=1.47, there was no difference in the im-
partiality dilemmas, F(1,232)= 2.03, p= .16, ηp2= 0.01; U=7700,
p= .097, d=0.18.
For the two items measuring perceived competence (α=0.89), the
ANCOVA showed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,480)= 23.96, p < .001, ηp2= 0.05; U=36,630, p < .001,
d=0.45, but no interaction between agent judgment and dilemma
type, F(1,480)= 0.28, p= .60, ηp2= 0.00. The non-consequentialist
was seen as more competent in both the sacrificial, F(1,247)= 13.57,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.05; U=9895, p < .001, d=0.47, and impartiality
dilemmas, F(1,232)= 10.27, p= .002, ηp2= 0.04; U=8291,
p= .005, d=0.41.
Finally, we turned to the single item of perceived loyalty. The
ANCOVA showed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,480)= 259.78, p < .001, ηp2= 0.35; U=49,147, p < .001,
d=1.44, and a non-significant but marginal interaction between agent
judgment and dilemma type, F(1,480)= 3.67, p= .056, ηp2= 0.001.
The non-consequentialist was seen as more loyal in both the sacrificial,
F(1,247)= 149.13, p < .001, ηp2= 0.38; U=13,265, p < .001,
d=1.52, and impartiality dilemmas, F(1,232)= 110.38, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.32; U=11,116, p < .001, d=1.35, though the effect sizes
were slightly larger in the sacrificial dilemma.
4.2.3. Prisoner's Dilemma
In order to assess the effects of agent judgment, dilemma type, and
participant judgment in the dilemma on the likelihood that participants
made cooperative decisions in the PD we conducted a 2× 2×2 lo-
gistic regression model. This model revealed no significant three-way
interaction between agent, dilemma, and participant judgment, only a
significant interaction of agent judgment and participant judgment,
B=−1.56, SE=0.62, Z=−2.51, p= .012, and a marginally sig-
nificant interaction of agent judgment and dilemma type, B=−0.86,
SE=0.46, Z=−1.88, p= .061. These interaction effects were sup-
plemented by a significant main effect of agent judgment, B=1.19,
SE=0.33, Z=3.60, p < .001, such that across dilemmas and re-
gardless of participant's own judgments, there was more cooperation
extended to the non-consequentialist (73%) than the consequentialist
(63%) agent. There was, however, no main effect of participant judg-
ment, B=0.08, SE=0.45, Z=0.17, p= .86, suggesting that overall,
Table 4
Ms, SDs, p-values and effects sizes in Study 3 as a function of dilemma type and agent judgment.
Sacrificial dilemmas Impartiality dilemmas
Non-conseq. Consq. p-value d Prefer Non-conseq. Consq. p-value d Prefer
Morality 5.87 (0.89) 4.18 (1.33) < .001 1.49 Non-C 5.33 (0.93) 5.30 (0.98) .53 0.04 –
Warmth 5.75 (0.85) 4.18 (1.23) < .001 1.49 Non-C 5.29 (0.98) 5.10 (1.09) .08 0.19 –
Competence 5.49 (1.18) 4.92 (1.24) < .001 0.47 Non-C 5.51 (0.98) 5.07 (1.16) .004 0.42 Non-C
Loyalty 5.87 (1.06) 3.81 (1.57) < .001 1.54 Non-C 6.13 (0.86) 4.56 (1.45) < .001 1.33 Non-C
Cooperation in PD 73% 57% .009 N/A Non-C 71% 72% .88 N/A –
Partner Preference 68% 22% < .001 N/A Non-C 62% 28% < .001 N/A Non-C
Suitability as a friend 5.72 (1.15) 3.95 (1.46) < .001 1.35 Non-C 5.39 (1.17) 4.88 (1.47) .01 0.39 Non-C
Suitability as a spouse 5.62 (1.20) 3.75 (1.54) < .001 1.35 Non-C 5.34 (1.16) 4.55 (1.46) < .001 0.61 Non-C
Suitability as a boss 5.21 (1.36) 3.78 (1.75) < .001 0.91 Non-C 5.02 (1.18) 4.66 (1.41) .03 0.28 Non-C
Suitability as a political leader 4.60 (1.63) 3.75 (1.85) < .001 0.49 Non-C 4.50 (1.28) 4.51 (1.53) .76 0.00 –
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consequentialist participants were roughly as equal to cooperate (77%)
as non-consequentialist participants were (64%) - though note that this
difference was significant when looking at simple effects with a chi-
square analysis ignoring the effects of agent judgment and dilemma
type, x2(1)= 5.79, p= .016, with consequentialists more likely to co-
operate.
The significant interaction effect between agent judgment and
participant judgment was such that, across dilemmas, non-con-
sequentialist participants were significantly more likely to cooperate
with a non-consequentialist agent (73%) than a consequentialist one
(55%), x2(1)= 11.48, p < .001, while consequentialist participants
were no more likely to cooperate with a consequentialist (81%) or non-
consequentialist (72%) agent, x2(1)= 1.25, p= .26 (see Fig. 4). This,
we think, explains the simple effect found above of consequentialists
being more likely to cooperate than non-consequentialists, when ig-
noring the effects of dilemma and agent judgment: consequentialist
participants do not discriminate, while non-consequentialist partici-
pants selectively choose to not cooperate with a consequentialist, thus
bringing down overall rates of cooperation.
Finally, while the interaction between agent judgment and dilemma
type was only marginally significant, we looked at simple effects re-
gardless and found that across both consequentialist and non-con-
sequentialist participants, people were more likely to cooperate with
the non-consequentialist (73%) than the consequentialist agent (57%)
in the sacrificial dilemma, x2(1)= 6.73, p= .009. In contrast, in the
impartiality dilemma there was equal cooperation extended towards
the consequentialist (71%) and non-consequentialist (72%) agents,
x2(1)= 0.02, p= .88.
4.2.4. Partner preference
Next, we looked at which agent the participant would have liked to
play the PD with, if they'd had a choice. A logistic regression revealed
no overall effect of dilemma type, B=−0.28, SE=0.19, Z=−1.48,
p= .14 with chi-square analyses revealing that across the dilemmas
most participants (65%) preferred to play with a non-consequentialist
over a consequentialist (35%). This was the case both in the sacrificial
dilemma, with 68% preferring the non-consequentialist, x2(1)= 33.12,
p < .001; and the impartiality dilemma, with 62% preferring the non-
consequentialist, x2(1)= 12.93, p < .001.
4.2.5. Role suitability
Next, we looked at perceived suitability for different roles (see
Fig. 3). For perceived suitability as a friend, an ANCOVA revealed the
predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,480)= 97.14, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.17; U=42,377, p < .001, d=0.87, along with a significant
interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a friend
participants thought the agent would be, F(1,480)= 26.17, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.05. In both dilemmas when the agent made a non-con-
sequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better friend, but
this effect was stronger for the sacrificial dilemma, F(1,247)= 117.38,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.19; U=12,759, p < .001, d=1.34, than for the
impartiality dilemma, F(1,232)= 10.40, p= .001, ηp2= 0.04;
U=8093, p= .014, d=0.39.
For perceived suitability as a spouse, an ANCOVA revealed the
predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,480)= 124.95, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.21; U=44,134, p < .001, d=0.99, along with a significant
interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a spouse
participants thought the agent would be, F(1,480)= 18.36, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.04. In both dilemmas when the agent made a non-con-
sequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better spouse, but
this was stronger for the sacrificial dilemma, F(1,247)= 119.82,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.33; U=12,813, p < .001, d=1.35, than for the
impartiality dilemma, F(1,232)= 22.69, p < .001, ηp2= 0.09;
U=9012, p < .001, d=0.60.
For suitability as a boss, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main
effect of agent judgment, F(1,480)= 47.36, p < .001, ηp2= 0.09;
U=38,815, p < .001, d=0.63, and a significant interaction of di-
lemma type and agent judgment on how good a boss participants
thought the agent would be, F(1,480)= 15.50, p < .001, ηp2= 0.03.
When the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were ex-
pected to make a better boss, but this was stronger again for the sa-
crificial dilemma F(1,247)= 51.14, p < .001, ηp2= 0.17; U=11,316,
p < .001, d=0.90, than for the impartiality dilemma, F
(1,232)= 4.68, p= .032, ηp2= 0.02; U=7904, p= .036, d=0.28.
Finally for perceived suitability as a political leader, i.e. President of
the United States, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of
agent judgment, F(1,480)= 8.64, p= .003, ηp2= 0.02; U=33,156,
p= .013, d=0.29, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and
agent judgment on how good a political leader participants thought the
agent would be, F(1,480)= 8.61, p= .004, ηp2= 0.02. When the agent
made a non-consequentialist judgment in the sacrificial dilemma they
were expected to make a better political leader, F(1,247)= 14.69,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.06; U=9693, p < .001, d=0.49, but there was no
difference in the impartiality dilemma, F(1,232)= 0.00, p= .99,
ηp2= 0.00; U=6702, p= .77, d=0.01.
4.3. Discussion
In the context of a sacrificial dilemma, we successfully replicated
and extended previous findings. We found that on every single depen-
dent measure, people who made non-consequentialist judgments in a
sacrificial dilemma were perceived more positively than those who
made a consequentialist judgment. As in Study 2, the pattern of results
for the impartiality dilemma was more nuanced, though a definite
pattern of preference for the non-consequentialist was observed. Out of
10 dependent measures, the non-consequentialist was preferred in six
measures and there was no preference in four measures. The non-con-
sequentialist was thought to be more competent and loyal; thought to
make a better friend, spouse, and boss; and preferred as a future partner
in a PD. There was no preference, however, in perceptions of morality
or warmth, perceived suitability as a political leader, or cooperation
extended in a PD.
Our results are equivocal as to whether non-consequentialist or
consequentialist participants were actually more cooperative. While
neither non-consequentialist nor consequentialist participants reliably
cooperated more overall, we did find that while non-consequentialist
participants selectively cooperated with non-consequentialist agents,
consequentialist participants cooperated equally with both agents. We
find no evidence, then, that non-consequentialists are systematically
Fig. 4. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma in Study 3 as a function of agent
judgment and participant judgment. Across both dilemmas, non-con-
sequentialist participants were more likely to cooperate with the non-con-
sequentialist agent than the consequentialist, but consequentialist participants
cooperated equally with both agents.
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more cooperative than their consequentialist counterparts. That said, it
is important to recognize two key caveats. The first caveat is that be-
haviour in the PD requires both the goal of cooperation and the ex-
pectation that others will cooperate (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), or in
other terms, a social preference to cooperate and a belief that others
will too (Everett et al., 2015a, 2015b). We have shown that non-con-
sequentialists distrust a consequentialist agent and do not expect them
to cooperate, and this will reduce cooperation. The second caveat is
that the cooperation in Study 3 was towards an anonymous stranger
with whom the participant will not interact again. Deontological ethics
typically focus on the duties and obligations we have, particularly to-
wards those close to us, and it is the respecting of these implicit duties
that seems to drive the preference for non-consequentialists (Everett
et al., 2016). Given this, even if non-consequentialists are not more
cooperative in anonymous settings towards strangers, this does not
necessarily indicate that the signal of non-consequentialists being more
cooperative is an incorrect one: the dimension in which that we are
measuring their cooperation (anonymous one-shot cooperation) is not
necessarily the one that the preference for non-consequentialists
emerges from (cooperation in repeated contexts with those we have
duties or obligations to). It would be interesting, therefore, for future
work to explore whether non-consequentialists and consequentialists
are more cooperative in different contexts.
5. Study 4
In our final study, we wanted to address two potential concerns with
the previous studies. The first concern is that there were differences in
how much the agents expressed conflict, or recognized competing
moral arguments against their decision. The non-consequentialist agent
in all dilemmas recognized the conflict by noting they could bring about
better consequences, but thought that other moral concerns were more
important. Similarly in the impartiality dilemma the consequentialist
agent briefly acknowledged the conflicting deontological duties (“by
donating the money to charity Amy would have the chance to bring
about more happiness for more people, and I think this is more im-
portant than any duties she has to her grandson”), but in the sacrificial
dilemma the consequentialist agent made no mention of the conflicting
duties (“she could find out which is the vaccine and therefore be able to
save many more lives, and I think that it is better to save many lives
than just one”). It is possible, then, that the strong preference for the
non-consequentialist we observed in the sacrificial but not impartial
dilemmas was partly driven by the fact that the consequentialist in the
sacrificial dilemmas expressed no awareness of moral conflict, but the
consequentialist in the impartiality dilemma did (see Table 2 for the
manipulation text in Studies 2–3). To address this, in our fourth study
we removed the mention of conflict for both agents in both dilemmas
(see Table 5 for the text used).
The second concern we wanted to address was that in Studies 2–3
we collected data on perceived motives of the agent, but did not report
the results in the main manuscript because of issues with the wording of
the question (see Footnote 6). We had asked participants to indicate on
a 11-point scale how much they thought the agent's decision was driven
“more by strategic, reasoned motives versus more empathic, altruistic
motives?”. However, on reflection this measure was sub-optimal both
because it conflates reasoned and strategic motives (which may not be
identical) and forces participants to select one side, when it is possible
that participants thought the action is both more strategic or reasoned
and more altruistic. To address this and gain insight to participants'
perceptions of the agent's motives, in Study 4 we used three separate
questions to assess perceived motives. First, we had participants rate on
a binary scale whether they thought the agent's decision was driven
more by emotion or reason (−5= Completely emotion; +5= completely
reason). Second and third, participants indicate separately how much
they thought the agent's decision was driven by strategic and altruistic
motives (1= not at all, 7= very much).
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Open science
Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan were all pre-registered at
the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/xr428/) as part of the Pre-
Registration Challenge. We report all measures, manipulations, and
exclusions in this study. All data, analysis code, and experiment ma-
terials are available for download at: https://osf.io/zf2dp/.
5.1.2. Participants
In accordance with the pre-registration, 500 participants completed
the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from com-
pleting the survey if they had participated in related studies by us in the
past, and were excluded from analysis if they completed the survey
more than once (N=2), or failed a simple comprehension check asking
them to indicate the decision their partner made in the dilemma
(N=41), leaving us with a final sample of 456 participants (218 fe-
male; Mage= 35, SD=10.87). Our sample size was determined
through an a priori power analysis (see supplementary methods for
details) and a sensitivity power analysis for our main 2×2 ANCOVA
analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of 0.80, indicated that the
minimum effect size we had power to detect was a small effect of
f=0.13. All participants were paid $1.20 for participating, in ac-
cordance with an hourly US minimum wage of $7.25 and the survey
taking approximately 10min.
5.1.3. Design
This study had a 2 (Dilemma Type: Sacrificial vs. Impartiality)× 2
(Agent Judgment: Non-consequentialist vs. Consequentialist) between-
subjects experimental design, and the procedure was the same as in
Study 2, except without an economic game and the addition of the three
motives questions outlined in the introduction to this study.
5.1.4. Analysis plan
The analysis plan for this study was identical to that in Studies 2–3.
See Table 6 for Ms and SDs as a function of dilemma type and agent
judgment, as well as p-values from a Mann-Whitney U test, and effect
sizes. Again, see supplementary results for analyses looking at a
2×2×2 ANOVA in which we entered participant moral judgment as
a fixed factor instead of a covariate, though like in the previous studies
there were no significant 3-way interactions.
Table 5
Reported judgments and justifications of the agent (“Person B”) in Study 4.
Non-consequentialist agent Consequentialist agent
Sacrificial (vaccine) I think that Amy should not inject the lab assistants with the substances to
find the vaccine. Killing is just wrong regardless of the consequences.
I think that Amy should inject the lab assistants with the substances to find
the vaccine. She could save many more lives - and I think that it is better to
save many lives than just one
Impartiality (spending
money)
I think that Amy should give the $500 to her grandson so that he could get
his car fixed, not the charity. It's most important she respects the duties
and obligations she has to her grandson
I think that Amy should give the $500 to the charity providing polio
vaccinations in the developing world, not her grandson. It's most important
that Amy uses the money to bring about the most happiness for the most
people.
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5.2. Results
5.2.1. Participant judgments
The majority of participants endorsed the non-consequentialist op-
tion in the sacrificial dilemmas (59%), rejecting the sacrifice of one to
save the lives of a greater number. Similarly, most participants en-
dorsed the non-consequentialist option in the impartiality dilemmas
(85%), endorsing helping a family member over impartially helping a
greater number. Again, further results looking at participant judgment
can be found in the supplementary materials.
5.2.2. Character ratings
We first looked at character ratings (see Fig. 1). For the two items
measuring perceived morality (α=0.89), the ANCOVA revealed the
predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,451)= 34.29, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.07; U=33,548, p < .001, d=0.54, and a significant inter-
action of dilemma type and agent judgment on how moral participants
perceived the agent to be, F(1,451)= 8.54, p= .004, ηp2= 0.02. The
non-consequentialist was seen as more moral than the consequentialist
in both the sacrificial dilemma, F(1,226)= 32.58, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.13; U=9165, p < .001, d=0.74, and the impartiality di-
lemma, F(1,224)= 5.27, p= .023, ηp2= 0.02; U=7397, p= .050,
d=0.29, though the effect was stronger in the sacrificial dilemma.
For the two items measuring perceived warmth (α=0.77), the
ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,451)= 23.33, p < .001, ηp2= 0.05; U=31,901, p < .001,
d=0.42, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent
judgment on how warm and sociable participants perceived the agent
to be, F(1,451)= 12.59, p < .001, ηp2= 0.03. While a non-con-
sequentialist was seen as warmer than the consequentialist in the sa-
crificial dilemma, F(1,226)= 32.19, p < .001, ηp2= 0.12; U=8996,
p < .001, d=0.74, there was no difference in the impartiality di-
lemma, F(1,234)= 0.95, p= .33, ηp2= 0.00; U=6795, p= .47,
d=0.11.
For the two items measuring perceived competence (α=0.89), the
ANCOVA showed no main effect of agent judgment, F(1,451)= 1.99,
p= .16, ηp2= 0.00; U=28,134, p= .12, d=0.13, and no interaction
between agent judgment and dilemma type, F(1,451)= 1.52, p= .22,
ηp2= 0.00. Contrary to predictions, there was no difference in the sa-
crificial dilemma, F(1,226)= 0.00, p= .95, ηp2= 0.00; U=6473,
p= .99, d=0.01, but the non-consequentialist was seen as more
competent in the impartiality dilemma, F(1,224)= 4.48, p= .035,
ηp2= 0.02; U=7488, p= .032, d=0.27.
Finally, we turned to the single item of perceived loyalty. The
ANCOVA showed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F
(1,451)= 122.74, p < .001, ηp2= 0.21; U=39,389, p < .001,
d=1.01, and a significant interaction between agent judgment and
dilemma type, F(1,451)= 4.78, p= .029, ηp2= 0.01. The non-
consequentialist was seen as more loyal in both the sacrificial, F
(1,226)= 37.28, p < .001, ηp2= 0.14; U=9081, p < .001,
d=0.77, and impartiality dilemmas, F(1,224)= 92.72, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.29; U=10,403, p < .001, d=1.24, though the effect was
stronger in the impartiality dilemma (see Fig. 2).
5.2.3. Role suitability
Next, we looked at perceived suitability for different roles (see
Fig. 3). For perceived suitability as a friend, an ANCOVA revealed the
predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,451)= 55.12, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.11; U=35,363, p < .001, d=0.68, and no interaction effect,
F(1,451)= 1.13, p= .29, ηp2= 0.00. In both dilemmas when the agent
made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to make a
better friend (sacrificial dilemma: F(1,226)= 34.59, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.13; U=9094, p < .001, d=0.77; impartiality dilemma: F
(1,224)= 21.10, p < .001, ηp2= 0.09; U=8494, p < .001,
d=0.58).
For perceived suitability as a spouse, an ANCOVA revealed the
predicted main effect of agent judgment, F(1,451)= 48.53, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.10; U=34,817, p < .001, d=0.64, but no significant inter-
action, F(1,451)= 0.02, p= .90, ηp2= 0.00. The non-consequentialist
agent was thought to make a better spouse in both the sacrificial, F
(1,226)= 21.81, p < .001, ηp2= 0.09; U=8589, p < .001,
d=0.60, and the impartiality dilemma, F(1,224)= 26.83, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.11; U=8706, p < .001, d=0.67.
For suitability as a boss, an ANCOVA revealed no main effect of
agent judgment, F(1,451)= 3.58, p= .059, ηp2= 0.01; U=27,809,
p= .17, d=0.17, and no interaction of dilemma type and agent
judgment, F(1,451)= 0.40, p= .53, ηp2= 0.00. Similarly for perceived
suitability as a political leader, an ANCOVA revealed no main effect of
agent judgment, F(1,451)= 1.81, p= .018, ηp2= 0.00; U=23,441,
p= .071, d=0.14, and no interaction of dilemma type and agent
judgment, F(1,451)= 0.04, p= .84, ηp2= 0.00.
5.2.4. Perceived motives
First looking at perceptions of whether the agents' decision was
driven more by emotion or reason on binary scale, we observed a sig-
nificant main effect of agent judgment, F(1,451)= 65.63, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.13; U=15,222, p < .001, d=0.74, and a significant inter-
action of dilemma type and agent judgment, F(1,451)= 41.39,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.08. In the sacrificial dilemma the non-con-
sequentialist was thought as being more driven by emotion and the
consequentialist by reason, F(1,226)= 118.54, p < .001, ηp2= 0.34;
U=2185, p < .001, d=1.42, but there was no difference in the im-
partiality dilemma, F(1,224)= 1.19, p= .28, ηp2= 0.01; U=5724,
p= .15, d=0.15.
Next, we looked at how much the agent's decision was thought to be
influenced by strategic motives. We observed a significant main effect
Table 6
Ms, SDs, p-values and effects sizes in Study 4 as a function of dilemma type and agent judgment.
Sacrificial dilemmas Impartiality dilemmas
Non-conseq. Consq. p Value d Prefer Non-conseq. Consq. p Value d Prefer
Morality 5.48 (1.27) 4.48 (1.45) < .001 0.74 Non-C 5.40 (1.12) 5.06 (1.22) .050 0.29 Non-C
Warmth 5.45 (1.10) 4.55 (1.36) < .001 0.74 Non-C 5.06 (1.06) 4.93 (1.19) .47 0.11 –
Competence 4.99 (1.41) 5.00 (1.30) .99 0.01 – 5.32 (1.14) 5.02 (1.13) .032 0.27 Consq
Loyalty 5.51 (1.32) 4.40 (1.61) < .001 0.77 Non-C 6.08 (1.19) 4.32 (1.62) < .001 1.24 Non-C
Suitability as a friend 5.46 (1.26) 4.38 (1.56) < .001 0.77 Non-C 5.38 (1.34) 4.54 (1.54) < .001 0.58 Non-C
Suitability as a spouse 5.15 (1.42) 4.25 (1.61) < .001 0.60 Non-C 5.28 (1.37) 4.31 (1.56) < .001 0.67 Non-C
Suitability as a boss 4.80 (1.56) 4.48 (1.79) .29 0.19 – 4.86 (1.32) 4.68 (1.51) .39 0.13 –
Suitability as a political leader 4.07 (1.87) 4.30 (1.83) .29 0.13 – 4.16 (1.61) 4.43 (1.67) .12 0.16 –
Emotion (−) vs reason (+) −1.45 (3.14) 2.63 (2.48) < .001 1.42 a 0.20 (2.93) 0.68 (3.30) .15 0.15 –
Strategic motives 2.43 (1.43) 5.38 (1.46) < .001 2.04 Consq 3.85 (1.78) 4.14 (1.81) .23 0.16 –
Altruistic motives 4.68 (1.70) 4.80 (1.51) .93 0.07 – 4.08 (1.53) 5.18 (1.36) < .001 0.76 Consq
a The consequentialist was expected to be more driven by reason, and the non-consequentialist was thought to be more driven by emotion.
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of agent judgment, F(1,451)= 107.04, p < .001, ηp2= 0.19;
U=13,549, p < .001, d=0.92, and a significant interaction of di-
lemma type and agent judgment, F(1,451)= 74.39, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.14. In the sacrificial dilemma the consequentialist was thought
as being more driven by strategic motives than the non-con-
sequentialist, F(1,226)= 227.48, p < .001, ηp2= 0.50; U=1235,
p < .001, d=2.04, but there was no difference in the impartiality
dilemma, F(1,224)= 1.14, p= .29, ηp2= 0.01; U=5859, p= .23,
d=0.16 (See Fig. 5).
Finally, we looked at how much the agent's decision was thought to
be influenced by altruistic motives. We observed a significant main
effect of agent judgment, F(1,451)= 17.96, p < .001, ηp2= 0.04;
U=20,562, p < .001, d=0.40, and a significant interaction of di-
lemma type and agent judgment, F(1,451)= 11.73, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.03. In the sacrificial dilemma there was no difference in how
much either agent was thought to be influenced by altruistic motives, F
(1,226)= 0.33, p= .56, ηp2= 0.00; U=6421, p= .93, d=0.07, but
in the impartiality dilemma the consequentialist was thought to be
more driven by altruistic motives, F(1,224)= 32.43, p < .001,
ηp2= 0.13; U=3866, p < .001, d=0.76.
5.3. Discussion
In Study 4 we conducted another pre-registered investigation of
perceptions of non-consequentialist and consequentialist agents in both
sacrificial and impartiality dilemmas, adding three new questions to
assess perceptions of the agent's motives and addressing potential
concerns with the manipulation of the agent's judgment.
First, we saw that the consequentialist was seen as more influenced
by strategic motives in the sacrificial dilemma, but more by altruistic
motives in the impartiality dilemma. And while in the sacrificial di-
lemma the non-consequentialist was thought as being more driven by
emotion and the consequentialist by reason, there was no difference in
the impartiality dilemmas for perceptions of being driven by reason or
emotions.
Second, we addressed the potential concern with the previous stu-
dies that the consequentialist expressed awareness of conflict for the
impartiality, but not sacrificial, dilemma. When ensuring that all agents
expressed no recognition of competing moral reasons, we broadly re-
plicated the findings of Study 3, with some minor differences. Like in
Study 3, in the impartiality dilemma the non-consequentialist was seen
as more competent, more loyal, and expected to make a better friend
and spouse. However, while in Study 3 the non-consequentialist was
thought to make a better boss, there was no difference in Study 4; and
while in Study 3 there was no difference in perceived morality, in Study
4 the non-consequentialist was seen as more moral. In neither study was
there a difference in perceptions of warmth or suitability as a political
leader. It seems clear, then, that our pattern of results cannot be ex-
plained simply by the agent's (lack of) expression of moral conflict:
regardless of whether they expressed conflict or not, the non-con-
sequentialist in the impartiality dilemma tended to be favored for di-
rect, interpersonal roles. This mirrors our previous work showing that
expressing internal conflict through reported emotional difficulty when
making a consequentialist decision reduces, but does not fully elim-
inate, the preference for a non-consequentialist over a consequentialist
(Everett et al., 2016). It will be interesting for future research to ex-
amine how expressing conflict through different kinds of moral justi-
fications influences person perception.
6. General discussion
Much work over the last decade has focused on the psychological
processes underlying judgments about whether it is moral to sacrifice
one innocent person to save a greater number of people. In recent years,
befitting the fundamentally social role of moral judgments, researchers
have begun to consider the social consequences of these judgments:
how are consequentialist individuals who endorse harming for the
greater good perceived? Previous work has shown that the judgment a
person makes in these sacrificial dilemmas influences how moral,
warm, and competent they are perceived to be, and even how much
cooperation is extended towards them in economic games (e.g. Bostyn
& Roets, 2017; Everett et al., 2016; Rom et al., 2017; Uhlmann et al.,
2013). But while this work has focused solely on judgments in sacrifi-
cial dilemmas and has been thought to shed light on the social con-
sequences of consequentialist judgments in general, consequentialism
involves much more than just judgments about whether to sacrifice one
to save a greater number.
As outlined in the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology
(Kahane et al., 2018, 2015), judgments in sacrificial dilemmas tap the
endorsement of “instrumental harm”, which can be theoretically and
empirically distinguished from impartiality dilemmas that tap the more
positive, impartial welfare-maximising dimension (“impartial benefi-
cence”) of consequentialist theories and consequentialist tendencies in
ordinary people. Because this previous work on perception of con-
sequentialist agents has focused almost exclusively on sacrificial di-
lemmas, it has remained unknown whether the preference for non-
consequentialists over consequentialists operates similarly in im-
partiality dilemmas in which someone faces the decision to help
someone close to them or a greater number of strangers.
In four studies, we investigated perceptions of consequentialist and
non-consequentialist decision makers in both sacrificial dilemmas tap-
ping instrumental harm, and impartiality dilemmas tapping impartial
Fig. 5. Perceived motives in Study 4 as a function of agent judgment and
participant judgment. Results show that in the sacrificial dilemma, the con-
sequentialist was seen as being driven more by strategic motives (5a) than the
non-consequentialist, and in the impartiality dilemma the consequentialist was
seen as driven more by altruistic motives (5b) than the non-consequentialist.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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beneficence. Pre-registering our analyses and predictions, we included
the most comprehensive range of dependent measures used in this lit-
erature to date, using different economic games (the Trust Game and
the Prisoner's Dilemma); examining the distinct dimensions along
which the agent's character could be perceived (warmth; competence;
morality); exploring the different processes or motivations perceived to
influence the agent's moral decision (strategic, altruistic, emotion-
based, and reason-based); and considering the different social roles and
relationships in which the agent would be preferred (as a friend, a
spouse, a boss, and as a political leader).
6.1. Person perception in sacrificial dilemmas
In the domain of sacrificial harm, our findings strongly confirm
previous work highlighting the cost of being consequentialist. We show
in three studies that non-consequentialists were consistently preferred
over consequentialists. We argue that this is perfectly explicable on a
partner choice account of non-consequentialist moral intuitions
(Everett et al., 2016). The consequentialist rejection of any constraints
on the maximisation of welfare means that if killing one's partner
maximises the greater good, then that is what one should do. And yet
when selecting a social partner for the purposes of continued co-
operative exchange, such a person would seem disastrous. Instead, we
have argued, it would be more advantageous for people to seek social
partners who maximise good consequences, but also those who also
exhibit respect for rights, duties, and the individuality of persons. Given
that consequentialists are consistently disfavored in the cooperation
market, partner choice mechanisms could explain why our moral in-
tuitions in such sacrificial dilemmas so often lean deontological (Everett
et al., 2016). Put simply, non-consequentialist, or deontological, judg-
ments confer an adaptive function by increasing the likelihood of being
chosen as a cooperation partner. It pays – in our studies, literally – to be
a non-consequentialist in a sacrificial dilemma.
6.2. Person perception in impartiality dilemmas
What about impartiality dilemmas? As discussed in the introduc-
tion, how people are perceived in the domain of impartial beneficence
remains largely unknown, because almost all previous work has focused
on sacrificial dilemmas. The pattern of results in the impartiality di-
lemmas was much more nuanced than the unequivocal preference for
the non-consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, though simply
counting overall results suggest that the non-consequentialist has the
edge over the consequentialist in the domain of impartial beneficence
too: overall, we saw few cases where the consequentialist was pre-
ferred, typically seeing either a null effect or that the non-con-
sequentialist was favored. Most interestingly, our results using the im-
partiality dilemmas appear to suggest a predictable pattern of when
non-consequentialists are preferred – and when they are not.
Impartial consequentialists were consistently disfavored for roles
involving a direct interpersonal relationship, even if they were not
explicitly rated as being deficient in morality and warmth. In all four
studies, the impartial consequentialist was thought to be less loyal and
thought to make a worse friend and spouse, even if they were not al-
ways explicitly rated as being deficient in morality and warmth. And in
Study 3 - but not Study 2 - the impartial consequentialist was also
disfavored as a future partner in a Prisoner's Dilemma and was thought
to make a worse boss. This makes sense given the theoretical basis we
draw on in the introduction: consequentialism's requirement for the
impartial maximisation of welfare is often inconsistent with the nature
of special relationships like friendship and familial duties that are a
fundamental part of common-sense morality (Jeske, 2014; W.D. Ross,
1930). When we enter a close, interpersonal partnership – with a friend,
or a team-mate, or a spouse - we expect partiality by agreeing on certain
special obligations ourselves and expecting them to be honoured by our
friend. We are expected to help our friend when they need it, and we
expect our friend to help us when we need it, but consequentialism's
denial of any such obligations is incompatible with what we seek in
social partners. This, we think, is why participants consistently rated
the impartial consequentialist as being less loyal and as making a worse
friend or spouse.
While it makes sense for non-consequentialists to be favored for
direct, interpersonal relationships, it is much more reasonable – even
preferable - to favor a consequentialist for distant, impersonal roles like
a political leader, and this what we what found in Studies 1 and 2. The
job of an effective political leader can be plausibly described as to make
constituents better off, and part of this requires acting impartially to not
favor one's own self-interest or the interest of one's immediate family.
Indeed, recent work has shown that people do not endorse efficient
maximisation in charitable giving unless one is in a position of re-
sponsibility, like a political leader (Berman, Barasch, Levine, & Small,
2018). Of course, this is not to say we should prefer an absolutely im-
partial political leader: a national leader who neglects his own country's
well-being and finances to support a poorer developing country is
hardly likely to be lauded as a moral paragon. We might prefer, in other
words, political leaders who are impartial within our group, but partial
between groups (and indeed, other research from social psychology
demonstrates that intergroup partiality is expected and favored in
group leaders (e.g. Duck & Fielding, 1999, 2003)). It would be fruitful
for future work to examine this directly, exploring in more detail the
way that moral impartiality is favored in both intra- and inter-group
contexts with varying degrees of personal connection.
Overall, then, while the pattern of results is weaker than for sacri-
ficial dilemmas, a tentative conclusion can be drawn: there may be
some costs of being consequentialist in the domain of impartial bene-
ficence, and this is especially manifested when considering suitability
and desirability for direct, personal relationships.
6.3. Person perception from impartial beneficence vs. instrumental harm
It is unsurprising that we saw stronger preferences for a non-con-
sequentialist agent who refuses to harm for the greater good, compared
to a non-consequentialist agent who refuses to help for the greater good.
There are of course important differences – both theoretical and psy-
chological - between instrumentally killing someone to achieve the
greater good and impartially maximising welfare by privileging stran-
gers over our family (Kahane et al., 2018). Many deontological tradi-
tions distinguish between the “perfect” absolute and universal duties
we have to refrain from some acts – e.g. murder -, and the more “im-
perfect” and context-dependent duties we have to help others (e.g.
Kant, 1797/2002). Analogously to research on punishment and
minimal and maximal standards in social psychology (Kessler et al.,
2010), in non-consequentialist moral approaches we can always blame
someone for murder, but we cannot always blame them for not helping
others. This is demonstrated psychologically with the “omission bias”,
by which directly harming someone is usually perceived as morally
worse than failing to help them (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron,
1990; Spranca et al., 1991; see also Siegel et al., 2017). When required
to maximise the greater good, a consequentialist endorsing instru-
mental harm may harm or even kill their partner to bring about an
impartially better state of affairs, while a consequentialist endorsing
impartial beneficence may simply neglect to help their partner, and it is
reasonable to assume that consequentialists who directly harm will be
perceived more negatively than those who just fail to help.
Furthermore, much psychological research has documented a posi-
tive-negative asymmetry in social cognition in general (Baumeister
et al., 2001) and person perception in particular (Skowronski & Carl-
ston, 1989). In general, “bad is stronger than good” such that bad
emotions are more powerful than good emotions, bad information is
processed more thoroughly than good information, and –most critically
- bad information about a person is more impactful than good in-
formation about a person. It is reasonable, then, that information about
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a ‘bad’ action (murder) would be more impactful than information
about different types of ‘good’ actions (helping others). It will be in-
teresting for future research to explore more the way that people per-
forming obligatory and supererogatory impartially beneficent acts will
be seen.
6.4. The costs of consequentialism: Implications for the partner choice
model
We have previously argued for a partner choice7 model of non-
consequentialist moral intuitions in sacrificial dilemmas (Everett et al.,
2016), whereby if non-consequentialist agents are preferred as social
partners and are therefore more likely to reap the benefits of co-
operation, consequentialist moral intuitions could therefore have be-
come disfavored over more deontological, non-consequentialist ones.
Replicating previous work and supporting such a partner choice model,
we found again here that non-consequentialists in sacrificial dilemmas
were indeed favored, being both cooperated more with a TG and a PD,
and being more likely to be selected as a partner PD or TG.
In the impartiality dilemmas, however, we found little direct sup-
port for a partner choice model in the context of anonymous economic
exchanges: Participants did not cooperate more with non-con-
sequentialists. While these null-results are problematic for the partner
choice model of moral intuitions, we think that it's not possible to
completely reject this account, even as it applies to the domain of im-
partial beneficence. Critically, it is important to distinguish between a
partner choice model of moral intuitions in the domain of instrumental
harm from one for impartial beneficence. These two dimensions are
both theoretically and empirically dissociable, each having distinct
psychological correlates and appearing to be driven by distinct psy-
chological processes (Kahane et al., 2018, 2015). Proto-consequentialist
tendencies are not a unitary phenomenon and so it is perfectly plausible
that partner choice mechanisms would have favored non-con-
sequentialist intuitions in the domain of instrumental harm but not
impartial beneficence. But even recognizing this, we think that there
are two key reasons why even within the domain of impartial benefi-
cence, there are still reasons to think the partner choice model might
hold.
First, we acknowledge that the anonymous economic game context
may not be ideal to study partner preferences in the context of impartial
beneficence: the consequentialist agents explicitly indicated they
thought it better to impartially maximise welfare even with strangers,
and participants were themselves strangers to the agent. And while they
seemed to understand that they stood to benefit from the agent's im-
partial beneficence in an anonymous economic exchange, they still did
not cooperate more with them. It is possible, then, that a tension be-
tween participants' self-interest (which should lead towards to co-
operating more with a consequentialist) and their preference for non-
consequentialists in interpersonal interactions (c.f. the other results)
cancelled each other out. When playing a game in which the implicit
social contract is stronger (for example through players knowing each
other), it is possible that we would see a preference for the non-con-
sequentialist.
Second, even if participants did not cooperate more with either
agent in the anonymous economic games, they did consistently rate the
non-consequentialist as being a better friend and spouse, in line with
previous evidence that non-consequentialists in sacrificial dilemmas are
favored as long-term mating partners (Brown & Sacco, 2017). Given
that most people do tend to be more prosocial towards their close
friends and family, if in real life non-consequentialists were preferred as
friends and spouses, this would also lead to the same partner choice
mechanisms occurring.
6.5. Practical implications
Finally, our work has practical implications concerning how in ev-
eryday life groups and individuals who advocate a more impartial,
welfare-maximising consequentialist approach to moral decisions –
such as the “effective altruism” movement – might expect to be per-
ceived, and how this might limit their advocacy. Peter Singer is the
most influential living utilitarian thinker, and in part because of his
utilitarian consequentialist moral views is a leading proponent of ef-
fective altruism: a movement built around the idea of using reason and
evidence to find the best ways to help others. In particular, effective
altruism is concerned with using one's resources to have the most im-
pact in helping others, and many effective altruists have pledged to give
at least 10% of their income to cost-effective charities (MacAskill, 2015;
Singer, 2015). In practice, this means that effective altruists advocate
for donating money to charity to help relieve poverty and disease in the
developing world (e.g. the Against Malaria Foundation) rather than
advocating for local but less effective charities (e.g. local community
centers for the elderly or disabled). In this way, the consequentialist
action in our impartiality dilemmas we used in this study – and espe-
cially the spending money variant – directly match onto the action that
we should do on effective altruism principles. Our work suggests that
effective altruists may face stumbling blocks in how they are perceived
by others and that, while receiving far less criticism than con-
sequentialists can receive for endorsing instrumental harm, this may
still have harmful consequences for how the movement is perceived and
therefore, presumably, how many people join the movement and adopt
its principles.
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